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NOTES

1. I attempt to develop the case against the reductionist position in detail
in my book The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of
Science (Harvard University Press, 1993).
2. I must confess, in passing, that I am not at all sure what it is like to be
me. Not, of course, because I happen to be ignorant on this point, but because I
doubt whether the expression "what it is like to be me" makes any sense.

God and Contemporary Science, by Philip Clayton. Eerdmans Pub.
Co./Edinburgh University Press, 1997. Pp.xii and 274. $25.
DAN D. CRAWFORD, University of Nebraska-Lincoln
This book is one in the series Edinburgh Studies in Constmctive Theology
which seeks to "[return] to the central themes of systematic theology, relating past thought to areas of contemporary concern in a way that is both
faithful and creative." The volume under review, by Philip Clayton, a philosophy professor at Sonoma State University and one of the series editors,
is a creative mix of theological, philosophical, and scientific thinking.
The work is primarily theological in orientation, starting from
(Christian) theological premises and often appealing to faith and to the
Bible as authoritative. The aim of the book is to develop an account of
divine agency. But there is also a serious attempt to approach the subject
philosophically, to construct an account that meets general standards of
rationality and that has some grounding in what Clayton calls "universal
argument". In addition, philosophy contributes to the formulation and
defense of the panentheistic model of the divine nature that Clayton proposes in this work. Finally, and most importantly, the author attempts to
defend theological beliefs in a way that takes science seriously and accommodates as far as possible current theory and "scientific conclusions".
The debate with science is carried on on two fronts: first, Clayton tries to
show how God's actions can be viewed as compatible with contemporary
theory in the physical sciences and (to a lesser extent) cosmology. The
question he asks is: how can God perform special acts within the natural
realm without violating the well-confirmed laws of physics? And second,
in the final chapter of the book, Clayton enters into the current debate in
cognitive science over the nature of the human mind and its relation to the
body and brain. He seeks to resolve the question of how conscious
thoughts and intentions are connected to the physical world and to the
brain as a way of throwing light on God's relation to the world.
There are many suggestive ideas and authors' views discussed in this
book that relate to the meeting-ground between theology and science. I
have selected for consideration several topics that received the most sustained treatment and argumentation. First, I will evaluate Clayton's constructive proposal of a panentheistic view of God, and then turn to how he
engages with science on each of the two fronts mentioned above. My criticism will be philosophical and not theological; that is, I will not attempt to
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determine if his idea of God's activity is theologically adequate, but will
limit myself to the task of reconstructing his positive ideas and arguments
and assessing their cogency.

Panentheism
Clayton develops his panentheistic conception of God dialectically, trying to steer a middle path between classical theism (with its overemphasis
on God's transcendence) and pantheism (with its identification of God and
world). There is also a bold attempt, reminiscent of Hegel, to trace the historical development of the panentheistic idea, beginning with the Israelite
conception of Yahweh as the one and only God, "not confused with any
object in the world," but at the same time "present in all objects of the
world". (28-29) "The Israelite authors bring us to this point but they do not
take us beyond it. God is both transcendent and immanent, they teach, and
yet the implications of this both/ and are not fully spelled out .... " (29)
However, theologians in the last few centuries, reflecting on these ideas,
found that they were" driven to formulate a panentheistic notion of God as
both transcending and including the world." (115)
How should we understand the immanent half of this panentheistic
notion and the idea that God "includes" the world? Clayton explicates its
meaning in a variety of ways, but it is unclear whether any of the key terms
he uses to describe the relationship are supposed to be taken literally.
He states that "God is fully immanent in the world; in him we live and
move and have our being-and this in the strictest sense: to the extent that
we have being at all, we are 'composed' out of him who is Being itself." (47)
How are we composed out of him who is Being itself? " ... 'creation out
of nothing' implies that we are composed of nothing other than God; no
pre-existent matter served as our building blocks. Of course, creatio ex nihilo
does not automatically mean creatio ex deo; it does not mean that we consist
of God." (46, italics omitted) But still, it is not clear what being "composed
out of him" means positively if it does not mean that we consist of God.
In another discussion entitled "The Argument from Space" that draws on
the work of Jiirgen Moltmann, the author reinterprets the doctrine of
omnipresence to mean both that God is present in all things and that all
things are within the divine presence. "God can be present here wIllie still
subsuming all here's within a divine space that transcends and encompasses
physical space." (89, italics added) We are thus able "to think of God as coextensive with the world .... the world is contained within God; yet the world is
not identical to God. Precisely this is the core thesis of panentheism." (90)
We may well grant that the world is not identical to God because, on
Clayton's view, God is the infinite creator of the world; but the author
seems to be sidestepping the question of whether the world is identical
with any part of God. More specifically, it is a core thesis of classical panentheism as formulated by A.N. Whitehead that God's transcendent nature is
incomplete until it is actualized by the developing world of "actual entities". The world at any stage of its development is part of God, because it is
God's abstract, ideal nature becoming concrete. But Clayton eschews both
of these ideas-that the world completes God and that the world consti-
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tutes God. On his view, then, God may take his creatures to his bosom and
be present to them in the closest possible way, but he does not constitute
them and is not constituted by them.
Clayton has attempted to shadow forth by means of the metaphors of
'encompassing', 'subsuming within' and 'containing' a sense in which the
world is within God. But what the claim boils down to is that the world is
"similar" to God, that is, humans are created in God's image and thus
"reflect" his nature; and the natural laws discovered by science reflect the
constancy of God's character. But I do not see why the theist could not
allow that the world is within God in these ways, and so I don't see that
Clayton's panentheistic model forces any substantial revision in the classical theistic conception of God. It is finally just a matter of a greater emphasis on God's immanence.
One reason Clayton cannot go as far as classical panentheism in identifying the world and God is that the world is (in part) physical and the theistic God is pure spirit. And so it is not at all clear how physical things are
supposed to be encompassed by God or contained within him. In general,
the material character of the world is seriously downplayed in this discussion in favor of its finite and contingent character; and this is a problem for
a view that wants to take science seriously. (We will return to this question
below when we come to Clayton's account of the mind and its relation to
the physical world.)

Theology and the Physical Sciences
The last half of the book (chapters 5-8) is devoted to working out a theory of divine agency that "pay[s] very close attention to scientific conclusions." (238) The last two chapters, in which the author's constructive
views are presented, are largely independent of each other-the first dealing with God's interventions in the physical realm, where the dialogue is
mainly with physics; the second dealing with how we are to conceive of
divine and human agency, where the dialogue is carried on with cognitive
science and the philosophy of mind.
Clayton assumes in these discussions that "scientific results" can be separated from their metaphysical interpretations which are always "speculative"
and underdetermined by their empirical data. (But this distinction is oversimple: where do theories fall within it-say the theory of quantum
mechanics--{)n the side of unquestioned scientific "results" or on the side of
arguable interpretation?) Clayton holds that scientific results (and theories?)
demand some sort of metaphysical interpretation (they "plead" for it) (161);
and he thinks that ultimately they require a theological interpretation.
The metaphysical interpretation that science endorses is naturalism,
which is defined roughly as a view that rules in naturalistic causes and
explanations and rules out divine causes and explanations. Clayton views
his task as arguing "in the face of naturalism" (151) "that theism in general,
and panentheism in particular, is ... best able to integrate the scientific
results with what we know of our existence as human beings in this
world." (160) In the debate with science, he allows that some theological
beliefs may have to be revised; but he also thinks that theology, guided by
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its own set of doctrines and beliefs, may sometimes overrule scientific conclusions.

Does God Intervene?
Clayton begins his discussion with a helpful review of a number of different proposed accounts of how God might act in the physical realm, and
moves toward a constructive account of his own that incorporates aspects
of these views. The integrative theories of John Polkinghorne and Arthur
Peacocke are given the most prominence.
The theological constraints on the topic are based on the doctrine of
providence, that God ultimately controls human history and that God may
perform special acts that affect individuals or groups. Clayton rejects
Peacocke's naturalistic model of revelation and wants to keep the door
open for "particular intentions on the part of God." (226) On the side of science, there is a strong presumption in favor of the explanation of all events
in terms of physical laws. Also there are good theological reasons for thinking that God would not want to act in a way that violated natural lawsnamely that the natural order is an expression of God's initial creative act
and purpose. So, much of Clayton's discussion of God's activity is meant to
show how God can act on occasion without violating the laws of the physical sciences. Nor do we want to locate God's actions in the gaps or cracks
of science, since past attempts to do this have too often found that science
has soon filled these gaps to the embarrassment of theology.
It is however significant that although physics has made its case for natural laws governing physical events, Clayton does not think the same is
true of the social sciences; more specifically, there is no similar presumption
in favor of psychological laws that explain human thinking and willing.
Clayton thinks it is natural to look for God's actions at the level of the
"smallest particles" since (citing physicist Karl Young) "all current bets in
physics are on a fundamental theory of the natural world being based
essentially on relativity and quantum mechanics." (193) The view that he
finds most promising is that God intervenes at the level of indeterminate
quantum events. This is not locating God's actions in the cracks of science
because the best current theory is that these indeterminacies are ontologically real, and so science will never be able to find more than statistical
laws governing these events. His idea is that it is reasonable to believe that
these spaces where God acts are in nature and not simply in our knowledge of nature. A full doctrine of God requires an open world, one with
causal spaces in which God can act." (212)
Clayton's attempt to specify the locus, the "causal joint", of the divine
agent's interventions in a way that still allows for physicalistic explanations is suggestive (and ingenious). (I have had to omit his fascinating discussion of how chaos theory has opened up another possible avenue of
divine influence.) But there are problems-some of them raised by
Polkinghorne and Peacocke-with locating God's activity at the quantum
level that Clayton mentions, but does not adequately answer.
First, God would have to act infrequently enough that he did not alter
the statistical probabilities of those events. If God makes minute changes
that produce a pattern of effects at the level of history as a whole, it is not
1/
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clear why this wouldn't be contravening the statistical laws that would
otherwise regulate those events. Even a single intervention would alter the
probability law that exactly governs events of that kind-whether or not
humans could detect the anomaly; so God would still be violating the natural order that he put into place at creation.
If God wants to intervene in the world-say to inspire the prophet or to
harden pharoah's heart, then he is going to alter the natural course of
events. But it would seem that the best avenue for effecting this change, on
Clayton's view of the natural realm, is to act directly on the mind and will
of the human subject, since there are no known laws to violate in the psychological realm. But Clayton thinks that God acts most rationally if he initiates a microphysical quantum change in the brain which then, by upward
causation, produces the desired mental change. It may seem that, on this
view, God is going to a lot of trouble to avoid the appearance of irrationality. But if the objection I raised above is correct, then it doesn't really help if
God acts on the brain directly (and indirectly on the mind) for he would
still be acting contrary to natural (statistical) laws.

Divine Agency and Physicalism
In the concluding chapter 8, Clayton turns to the question of how we are
to conceive of divine action. He notes first that we must think of divine
agency by analogy with human agency. And so the first order of business
is to form an adequate conception of the human mind and its relation to
the physical world. Specifically, we need to "solve the problem of human
mental causation-the question of how human intentions and desires get
translated into events in the physical world." (233) For if we understand
this, then we can move by inference to an analogous characterization of
God's activity in the world.
Clayton attempts to develop an adequate theory of mind by entering
into the thorny debate within cognitive science about the nature of the
mind, including consciousness, and its relation to the body. What he finds
of course is that the dominant view of the mind is functionalist, physicalist,
and reductionist. His main target is a view of the mind that combines
physicalism (defined roughly as the view that everything that exists in the
natural realm is physical) and reductionism (defined roughly as the idea
that the mental can be fully understood and explained in terms of the
physical). This view of the mind is antithetical to the theistic ideas of God
as pure spirit and the survival of the individual after death. But more
importantly for Clayton's project, if mental states are unreal or are
reducible to brain states, then when the "panentheistic analogy" between
God's relation to the world and the mind's relation to the body is pressed
(as it is in this chapter), we will be forced to understand God as a physical
being (pantheism), or as an aspect of the physical world whose existence is
dependent on the world's existence. And this is unacceptable theologically.
The theologian's task, then, is first and foremost to secure the irreducibility of mind and consciousness. Accordingly, Clayton stakes out a position
within the current debate in cognitive science that would show that conscious mental states (a) exist in their own right; and (b) have an autonomy
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from the body and brain. He defends the latter thesis by arguing that mental states have "causal powers", viz., they are causally effective in producing other mental states and changes in the physical body. The two theses
are connected because if he can establish that mental states have causal
powers, then this is a basis for claiming that they have a reality separate
from the body.
Clayton's arguments for these theses finally rest on an appeal to our
commonsense assumption that mental states can cause other mental states
("the idea of '23 + 47' ... gives rise to the idea of '70"'), (254) and that mental
states can cause physical states (your "intention to cease reading this book
... [can] cause your eyes to cease moving across this page" ) (255). Beyond
this, he asserts that there is no reason to think that the folk psychological
explanations in terms of thoughts and intentions could ever be replaced by
explanations in terms of neurological processes.
Clayton's aim is to secure a place for mind in the physical world.
Conscious mental states are real. This is not to say that minds are real
things or substances; he concurs with science that there is no place in nature
for immaterial substances. Instead he uses the language of 'emergence' and
'supervenience' to define the relation of mind to body.
But how exactly is mental causation possible? Recall that Clayton set
himself the task of resolving the question of "how human intentions get
translated into events in the physical world" in order to throw light on
how God can act on the world. The question is also important for his larger
panentheistic thesis because in this chapter he is pressing the "panentheistic analogy" between the mind's relation to the body and God's relation to
the world. But unfortunately Clayton has nothing to say about how minds
can effect changes in the physical world beyond pointing to the obvious
fact that since humans commonly do effect change, then it must be possible
to do this without violating natural laws. But this doesn't resolve anything.
For if minds are emergent existents that can induce changes in their neurological substructures that cannot be explained by antecedent neurological
states, then it is problematic how this could occur without violating physical laws. (Note that it wouldn't be a problem if those mental states were
properties of the physical brain.) More must be said about how minds can
produce change in the world and in the brain once they have been given
the degree of autonomy Clayton gives them.
This omission is part of a larger shortcoming in the book. Just as Clayton
could not find a place for the physical in God's nature, so he is uncertain
about how the body is a part of human nature. At one point he says that
one of his aims is to develop a "more holistic" conception of the human
person-one that is in keeping with the Biblical idea-that views the person as "an integrated set of connections between her mental and physical
functions." (236) One looks in vain for these connections; what one finds
instead is the bare assertion that mental causation can occur.
I want to suggest that there may be more resources within cognitive science for mind-body inter-connections than Clayton has tapped. In his battle with physicalism, Clayton has pointed to tendencies within cognitive
science that separate the mind and consciousness from the body, citing
Thomas Nagel and Colin McGinn, for example. But there is a strand in this
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debate-notably in the work of Mark Johnson and Maxine SheetzJohnstone-that emphasizes the dependency of conscious life on the body
and the way in which our concept of mental processes is built on a concept
of bodily processes. This line of thought is physicalist to be sure (as are all
the views that Clayton considers), but it is not reductionist and is fully consistent with a robust view of an autonomous mental life. It would seem
that this is an approach to the mind that Clayton should pay some attention to. Why doesn't he? I suggest that Clayton isn't interested in identifying mind-body connections that are being worked out by cognitive scientists, and in applying them by analogy to God's nature, because there is no
place in God for the physical. To press the panentheistic analogy too closely would make it too close for theological comfort.
Clayton seeks a rapprochement with science, and he goes some way
toward showing how classical theistic beliefs about divine action are compatible with current physical theories and with cognitive science. But he
cannot find a way to appropriate the physicalist assumption of science, and
the main thrust of his argument is to reject it. The theological ideas that
God is pure spirit and that humans can survive death finally lead him to a
metaphysics of the person that stresses the separateness of mind from
body, and that downplays the role of the body in human experience.

Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory, by John Finnis. Oxford
University Press, 1998. Pp. xxi and 385. Price $18.95 (paperback).
ROBERT PASNAU, University of Colorado
The study of philosophy's history is often a tedious affair, devoted to primary texts that seem only intermittently relevant today and to secondary
studies that offer at best a pale reflection of the great minds they pursue.
But every once in a while a study is published that sheds real light on some
historical period, and one feels as if here, at last, some long-dead philosopher has finally been favored with an interpreter worthy of the task.
John Finnis is such an interpreter, and his new book is such a study.
Amidst a flurry of important works published over the past few years on
Thomas Aquinas, Finnis's Aquinas stands out as the most philosophically
insightful and provocative of them alP
In one respect this book cannot be judged by its cover, which reads simply Aquinas,' suggesting a general survey of the man and his work. The
subtitle (revealed on the title page) provides an accurate picture of the
book's exclusive focus on moral and political philosophy, a focus that is
particularly welcome given the relative neglect of these topics in the literature on Aquinas.
In another respect this book very much can be judged by its cover. For
inasmuch as one knows the work of John Finnis, one already will have quite
a good sense of the views presented here. One will rightly suppose that it
offers a detailed account of Aquinas's theory of human action, that it presents an intelligent and attractive version of Aquinas's natural law theory,
I

